State of Utah, Plaintiff/Appellee,  vs. Daniel Bagley Rogers, Defendant/Appellant : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
State of Utah, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. Daniel Bagley
Rogers, Defendant/Appellant : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffrey S. Gray; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Gary K. Searle;
Tooele County Attorney\'s Office; Counsel for Appellee.
Debra M. Nelson; Shannon Romero; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Rogers, No. 20030953 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4655
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DANIEL BAGLEY ROGERS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030953-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR THEFT BY RECEIVING 
.STOLEN PROPERTY, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLA 1 ION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDKTAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN PRESIDING 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
SHANNON ROMERO 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n 
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300 
Sait Lake City, UT 84111 
Counsel for Appellant 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
Assistant Attorney Genera! 
MARK L. SRURTLEFF (4666; 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
GARY K. SEARLE 
Tooele County Attorney's Office 
Counsel for Appeliee 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUL H 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DANIEL BAGLEY ROGERS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030953-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR THEFT BY RECEIVING 
STOLEN PROPERTY, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN PRESIDING 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
DEBRA M. NELSON Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
SHANNON ROMERO Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n 
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300 GARY K. SEARLE 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Tooele County Attorney's Office 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
Summary of Proceedings 4 
Summary of Facts 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 9 
I. THE MAGISTRATE IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM REOPENING A 
PRELIMINARY HEARING FOR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AFTER 
THE STATE HAS RESTED, OR FROM CONTINUING THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TO TAKE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE 9 
A. THE BRICKEY RULE APPLIES ONLY TO THE REFILING OF CHARGES 
EARLIER DISMISSED FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT A PRELIMINARY 
HEARING 10 
1. Brickev and its Progeny Addressed the Propriety of Refiling Charges 
That Were Earlier Dismissed 10 
2. The Brickev Rule Should Not Be Extended to Reopenings or 
Continuances 12 
3. Even if Brickey Applied to Reopenings and Continuances, the 
Reopening and Continuance Here Did Not Violate Brickev 15 
B. NEITHER THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE NOR THE RULES OF 
EVIDENCE BAR A CONTINUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY HEARING OR THE 
REOPENING OF THE STATE'S CASE AFTER THE PROSECUTION HAS 
RESTED 20 
i 
II. THE EVIDENCE AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE THAT 
DEFENDANT POSSESSED THE BASEBALL MEMORABILIA FOUND 
IN HIS FRIEND'S CAR AND APARTMENT 25 
CONCLUSION 27 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A (Memorandum Decision) 
11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177 (Utah 1998) 26 
Harper v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 484 P.2d 891 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1971) 14,15 
Holmes v. District Court of Summit County, 668 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1983) 11, 19, 20 
Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) 11 
Peoplev. Walls, 324N.W.2d 136 (Mich. App. 1982) 11 
State v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, 89 P.3d 191 1 
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) passim 
State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,20 P.3d 300 2, 17, 26 
State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860 (Utah App. 1998) 10, 11 
State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985) 25 
State v. Gregorious, 81 Utah 33,16 P.2d 893 (1932) 22 
State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, 3 P.3d 725 17 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 2 
State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Utah App. 1989) (withdrawn from publication) 23,24 
State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951) 22, 23 
State v. Layman, 985 P.2d 911 (Utah 1999) 25 
State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 34 P.3d 767 passim 
State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 
(Utah 1992) 13 
Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, 989 P.2d 1073 1 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989) 22 
iii 
State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243 (Utah 1985) 17 
State v. Redd, 2001XJT 113, 37 P3d 1160 10, 11, 12, 19 
State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991) 25 
State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, 65 P.3d 648, cert, granted, 16 P.3d 691 (Utah 
2003) 13,22 
State v. Webb, 162 N.W. 358 (N.D. 1917) 24 
Stockwellv. State, 573 P.2d 116 (Idaho 1977) 11 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2002) 1 
STATE RULES 
UtahR. Evid. 1102 3, 20, 21 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7 21,22 
IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DANIEL BAGLEY ROGERS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030953-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* & * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for theft by receiving stolen property, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was the State precluded from reopening its case after resting or from obtaining a 
continuance of the preliminary hearing under State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), 
and its progeny or under Utah court rules? 
Standard of Review. "Interpretation of case law presents a question of law which is 
reviewed for correctness." State v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, f 7, 89 P.3d 191. The 
interpretation of a rule of procedure is likewise a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Ostler v. Bvhler, 1999 UT 99, \ 5, 989 P.2d 1073. 
2. Was the evidence of defendant'' s constructive possession of the stolen memorabilia 
sufficient for bindover? 
Standard of Review. The determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant over 
for trial is a question of law reviewed for correctness, without deference to the magistrate. 
State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, Tf 8, 20 P.3d 300. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i) 
(i)(l) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held 
under the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The 
state has the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the 
conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call 
witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine 
adverse witnesses. 
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that 
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed 
it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to 
answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on 
hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was 
acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary 
examination. 
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate 
shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may 
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The 
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense. 
2 
Utah R. Evid. 1102 
(a) Statement of the Rule. Reliable hearsay is admissible at criminal 
preliminary examinations. 
(b) Definition of Reliable Hearsay. For purposes of criminal preliminary 
examinations only, reliable hearsay includes: 
(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah Rules of Evidence; 
(2) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, regardless of the availability of the declarant at the preliminary 
examination; 
(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any 
exhibit; 
(4) scientific, laboratory, or forensic reports and records; 
(5) medical and autopsy reports and records; 
(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace 
officer; 
(7) a statement made by a child victim of physical abuse or a sexual 
offense which is promptly reported by the child victim and recorded in 
accordance with Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
(8) a statement of a declarant that is written, recorded, or transcribed 
verbatim which is: 
(A) under oath or affirmation; or 
(B) pursuant to a notification to the declarant that a false statement made 
therein is punishable. 
(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless of 
admissibility at trial under Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(c) Continuance for Production of Additional Evidence. If hearsay 
evidence is proffered or admitted in the preliminary examination, a 
continuance of the hearing may be granted for the purpose of furnishing 
additional evidence if: 
(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is 
not sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or 
(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly 
disadvantaged by the use of the hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests 
of the declarant and the efficient administration of justice. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged with theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree 
felony, and theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1-3. On December 17, 2003, a 
magistrate held a preliminary hearing. R. 222. The State called three witnesses and rested. 
See R. 222: 1-44. When defendant moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence, the 
prosecutor moved to reopen the case. R. 222: 45-47. The magistrate granted the State's 
motion and the State recalled the investigating officer. R. 222: 47-49. After the State 
finished questioning the officer, the parties argued the sufficiency of the evidence. R. 222: 
49-47. The magistrate concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish possession of 
all the recovered goods but the earrings, but that it did not adequately establish their value. 
R. 222: 57-59. The magistrate continued the hearing to permit the State to put on specific 
evidence of the value of the stolen goods that were recovered. R. 222: 58-61. 
On January 7,2003, the magistrate resumed the preliminary hearing. SeeR. 223. The 
State recalled the victim, who testified about the specific value of the recovered goods. R. 
222: 69-117. After the State rested and the parties argued the evidence, the magistrate bound 
defendant over for trial on theft by receiving stolen property, but dismissed theft by 
deception. R. 223: 126. Defendant filed a motion to quash the bindover, which the trial 
court denied. R. 48-54,175-81 (Addendum A). Defendant pled guilty to theft by receiving 
stolen property, amended to a third degree felony, reserving his right to appeal the trial 
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court's order denying his motion to quash. R. 217-18, 226. Defendant was sentenced to a 
suspended prison term of zero-to-five years and ordered to pay restitution. R. 182 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Preliminary Hearing (December 17, 2002) 
The following evidence was introduced at the preliminary hearing on December 17, 2002. 
\jjjjjjjn July 23,2002, Robert Hildebrand returned home from work and discovered that 
his home had been burglarized. R. 222: 6-7. Taken from the home were hundreds of 
baseball cards and twelve autographed baseballs—estimated by Hildebrand to be worth more 
than $10,000. R. 222:7-10,20-26,30. Also taken from Hildebrand's home was a new DVD 
player, a Minolta camera, a stereo, a set of black pearl earrings, and Olympic pins. R. 222:7-
11, 17-20. Hildebrand immediately reported the burglary to police. R. 222: 11. 
The following day, Hildebrand notified local baseball card shops of the theft. R. 222: 
11-12, 27, 30. About an hour after speaking with Hildebrand, Elvin Allen, the owner of a 
local card shop, was approached by two men offering to sell him "a bunch" of baseball cards 
that matched the description of those stolen from Hildebrand. R. 222: 28-29. Allen agreed 
to buy a few of the cards, issued a check for the purchase, and because the banks were closed 
for the holiday, referred the men to a local check-cashing store. R. 222: 28. After the men 
left, Allen notified Hildebrand and stopped payment on the check. R. 222: 13, 28-29. 
Hildebrand immediately notified police. R. 222: 13. 
After receiving Hildebrand's report, police converged on the check-cashing store 
where they found defendant and his friend Joshua Boone attempting to cash a check, payable 
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to defendant, from a baseball card shop. See R. 222: 13, 33-35, 37, 39, 42. The two men 
were detained by police and questioned by Detective Clinton Johnson. R. 222: 35. After 
waiving his Miranda rights, defendant told Detective Johnson that while cleaning out 
abandoned storage units at work, he "found some baseball cards and other items" near a 
dumpster and decided to sell them because he knew they were worth some money. R. 222: 
35,37-39. Boone told Detective Johnson that defendant had asked him for a ride to the card 
shop so defendant could sell some baseball cards. R. 222: 43. On inspecting Boone's car, 
Detective Johnson saw an autographed baseball on the front passenger seat and a single 
baseball card on the passenger side floorboard. R. 222: 36.l When Hildebrand arrived on 
the scene, he confirmed that the autographed baseball was the most valuable of those taken 
from his home, worth "well over" $500. R. 222: 8, 13-14, 20. 
In a search of Boone's car incident to arrest, police seized not only the baseball card 
and baseball from the passenger compartment, but additional baseball cards found in the 
trunk of the car. R. 222: 36,40-41. Hildebrand verified that all of the baseball memorabilia 
belonged to him. R. 222: 36. In a subsequent search of Boone's residence, police found 
more of Hildebrand's baseball memorabilia, as well as Hildebrand's DVD player and 
Olympic pins. R. 222:41. 
After the State rested, counsel for defendant moved to dismiss both charges for 
insufficient evidence. R. 222: 45-47. Counsel urged that at best, the evidence was sufficient 
1
 The car was driven by Boone, but belonged to his girlfriend. R. 222: 39, 43. 
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for bindover on the theft by receiving charge at a reduced degree, arguing that the evidence 
did not establish the necessary value for a second-degree felony. R. 222: 45-46. The 
magistrate denied defendant's motion and granted the State's request to reopen its case to 
recall Detective Johnson. R. 222: 47. He provided the following additional information. 
Detective Johnson recovered Hildebrand's earring set from a local pawn shop. R. 
222: 48-49. The pawn receipt indicated that defendant pawned the earrings. R. 222: 49. 
After finishing with Detective Johnson, the parties argued the sufficiency of the 
evidence for bindover. R. 222: 50-54. The magistrate concluded that the evidence was 
sufficient to bind defendant over on the theft by receiving charge, but was not satisfied with 
the evidence regarding the value of the recovered property. R. 222: 54-58. Against the 
objections of defense counsel, the magistrate continued the preliminary hearing to January 
7, 2003 to permit the State to put on additional evidence of value. R. 222: 56-64. 
Preliminary Hearing Continued (January 7, 2003) 
At the preliminary hearing on January 7, 2003, Robert Hildebrand testified to the 
value of the baseball memorabilia as follows. 
The baseball cards found in Boone's car were worth more than $1,200. See R. 223: 
72-75, 80, 88. The autographed baseball found on the front passenger seat of Boone's car 
was worth $600. R. 223: 88-89. Nine more autographed baseballs, worth $700, were found 
in Boone's car. R. 223: 81-86. The baseball cards found in Boone's apartment were worth 
approximately $10,000. See R. 223: 92-113. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Defendant contends that under State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), and its 
progeny, the prosecution was barred from reopening its case at the preliminary hearing and 
from obtaining a continuance to introduce additional evidence. The Brickey rule, however, 
applies only to the refiling of charges earlier dismissed at a preliminary hearing for 
insufficient evidence. It does not apply to reopenings or continuances. Nor should the 
Brickey rule be extended to reopenings and continuances. The risks of prosecutorial 
overreaching in refiling are not present in reopenings and continuances. Moreover, the rules 
of evidence and criminal procedure do not bar a reopening or continuance. Even assuming 
arguendo Brickey does apply, any failure of the prosecution to introduce evidence sufficient 
for bindover was at worst an innocent miscalculation of the evidence. As such, the 
magistrate properly reopened the prosecution's case and continued the hearing. 
II. Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish defendant's 
constructive possession of the stolen baseball memorabilia in his friend's car and apartment. 
While the evidence might be insufficient to meet the reasonable doubt burden required at 
trial, it was more than sufficient to meet the relatively low evidentiary standard required at a 
preliminary hearing. Defendant admitted to possessing cards that had been stolen from 
Hildebrand, he tried to sell the cards, his friend indicated that defendant asked for a ride so 
defendant could sell the cards, and defendant confirmed that he rode with defendant to sell 
the cards. In light of this evidence, it is reasonable to infer that defendant took the cards to 
his friend's apartment and from there went to the card shop with some of the cards. 
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ARGUMENT 
In his motion to quash the bindover, defendant argued that the magistrate improperly 
reopened the hearing after the State rested. R. 48-54. In denying his motion, the trial court 
reversed its ruling at the December 17 preliminary hearing and concluded that the evidence 
was sufficient for bindover before the State reopened its case. R. 179-80. The court also 
ruled that in any event, any alleged error in granting the motion to reopen was harmless. R. 
190&.2. 
L THE MAGISTRATE IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM REOPENING A 
PRELIMINARY HEARING FOR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AFTER 
THE STATE HAS RESTED, OR FROM CONTINUING THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TO TAKE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in reopening the preliminary 
hearing after the State had rested and continuing the hearing to permit the State to present 
more specific evidence on the value of the stolen property that was recovered. Aplt. Brf. at 
15-29, 34-50. Defendant claims that the reopening and continuance violated state due 
process under State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), and its progeny. Aplt. Brf at 16-. 
He also contends that the reopening and continuance were barred under rule 7 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Brf. at 41-
43, 49-50. These arguments fail. 
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A. THE BRICKEY RULE APPLIES ONLY TO THE REFILING OF CHARGES 
EARLIER DISMISSED FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT A PRELIMINARY 
HEARING 
1. Brickey and its Progeny Addressed the Propriety of Refiling 
Charges That Were Earlier Dismissed, 
In support of his claim that the reopening and continuance violated his state due 
process rights, defendant relies on Brickey and a line of Utah cases applying the "Brickey 
rule/' These decisions, however, address the refiling of criminal charges earlier dismissed 
for insufficient evidence at a preliminary hearing. In this case, the magistrate never 
dismissed the charges against defendant. These cases, therefore, do not apply here. 
In Brickey, the preliminary hearing magistrate dismissed the charge against defendant 
after finding insufficient evidence for bindover. 714 P.2d at 645. Disagreeing with the 
decision, and candidly admitting that he was forum-shopping, the prosecutor refiled the 
charge. Id. at 646-47. The Brickey Court acknowledged that refiling is not barred under 
state law or the double jeopardy provisions of the federal and state constitutions. Id. at 646. 
The Court held, however, that "due process considerations prohibit a prosecutor from refiling 
criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can show 
that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies 
refiling." 714 P.2d at 647 (emphasis added). In this case, the charges were never dismissed 
for insufficient evidence or for any other reason. 
Defendant also relies on State v. Redd, 2001 UT 113,37 P.3d 1160, State v. Morgan, 
2001 UT 87, 34 P.3d 767, and State v. Fish, 966 P.2d 860 (Utah App. 1998). See Aplt. Brf. 
at 16, 19-21, 29, 48-49. Those cases likewise involved the refiling of charges after a 
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dismissal following a preliminary hearing. See Redd, 2001 UT 113, at ^ f 1-3; Morgan, 2001 
UT 87, at f 4; Ffcfc, 966 P.2d at 861. They too, therefore, are inapposite. 
Support for defendant's claim in other jurisdictions is likewise absent. The cases 
cited by defendant from other jurisdictions are inapplicable for the same reason the Utah 
cases are inapplicable—they address only the refiling of charges after those same charges 
have been dismissed following a preliminary hearing. See Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169,171 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (after charges dismissed following a preliminary examination, 
prosecutor refiled same charges); Holmes v. District Court of Summit County, 668 P.2d 11 
(Colo. 1983) (after charges dismissed following a preliminary hearing, prosecutor filed 
information charging defendants with identical charges); People v. Walls, 324 N.W.2d 136 
(Mich. App. 1982) (after second-degree sexual conduct charge dismissed following a 
preliminary examination, prosecutor charged defendant with first-degree criminal sexual 
conduct); Stockwell v. State, 573 P.2d 116 (Idaho 1977) (after magistrate refused to bind 
defendant over for second degree murder, prosecutor dismissed voluntary manslaughter 
charge and refiled for second degree murder). 
In sum, defendant has cited no decision, and the State is aware of none, holding or 
even suggesting that due process is violated by reopening the State's case after the 
prosecution has rested or by continuing a preliminary hearing to permit the introduction of 
additional evidence. 
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2. The Brickey Rule Should Not Be Extended to Reopenings or 
Continuances. 
Defendant nevertheless claims that the Brickey rule should apply to requests to reopen 
the prosecution's case or to continue the preliminary hearing. Aplt. Brf. at 15-16 fn.2,18-20, 
41-49. He argues that reopening the State's case and continuing the hearing are "akin to 
dismissing and refiling" and implicate "the very same fundamental fairness and due process 
concerns" of refiling. Aplt. Brf. at 16 fh.2, 18-20, 41. These arguments are unpersuasive. 
"The lodestar of Brickey . . . is fundamental fairness." Morgan, 2001 UT 87, % 15. 
Brickey and its progeny have thus held that state due process precludes a prosecutor from 
seeking an unfair advantage over a defendant through abusive refiling practices. Redd, 2001 
UT 113, at % 13. Abusive practices that violate due process include: (1) forum shopping, 
Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647; (2) "repeated filings of groundless and improvident charges for the 
purpose to harass," Redd, 2001 UT 113, at *f 20; and (3) "intentionally holding back crucial 
evidence to impair a defendant's pretrial discovery rights and to ambush [him or] her at trial 
with the withheld evidence," Morgan, 2001 UT 87, at \ 14. 
None of these practices are implicated by reopening the State's case after the 
prosecution has rested or by continuing the hearing. First, there is no danger of forum 
shopping because the same magistrate presides over the reopened case and the continued 
hearing. Second, there is no danger of harassment by multiple criminal filings because there 
are none—defendant is charged with the offense only once. See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, at \ 
25 (finding no harassment where prosecutor "attempted to reopen the preliminary hearing 
immediately upon recognizing the magistrate was not satisfied with the level of evidence 
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required to bind over defendant"). Harassment through repeated continuances is also of no 
concern because the continuance of a proceeding is discretionary with the court. See State v. 
Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that "[t]he grant or denial of a 
continuance is within the discretion of the trial court"), cert denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 
1992); see also State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, f 35, 65 P.3d 648 (holding that "[a] trial 
court has discretionary authority to determine whether to reopen a case to admit additional 
evidence"), cert, granted on other grounds, 76 P.3d 691 (Utah 2003). And likewise, there is 
no danger of a prosecutor intentionally withholding crucial evidence because he or she runs 
the risk that the magistrate will deny any motion to reopen or continue. In short, none of the 
concerns identified in Brickey and its progeny are present with reopening or continuing. 
Defendant claims that the Brickey rule should be extended to continuances because 
the function of the Brickey rule is to "ensure[ ] that groundless or improvident prosecutions 
do not proceed, protect[ ] the defendant from the degradation and expense of having to 
defend at more than one preliminary hearing, [and] conserve[ ] judicial resources by not 
allowing the state to repeatedly waste court time by refiling cases and conducting multiple 
hearings . . . ." Aplt. Brf. at 18. That is not what the Court in Brickey held. Rather, the 
Court explained: 
The preliminary hearing [ ] acts as a screening device to 'ferret out 
. . . groundless and improvident prosecutions' This function [of the 
preliminary hearing] is important because it not only relieves the accused of 
the 'substantial degradation and expense' attendant to a criminal trial, but 
also because it helps conserve judicial resources and promotes confidence in 
the judicial system. 
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Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 (quotingState v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (1980)). In other 
words, ferreting out "groundless and improvident prosecutions" is the function of the 
preliminary hearing, not the Brickey rule. Relieving the accused of the "substantial 
degradation and expense of a criminal trial" is the purpose of'the preliminary hearing, not 
the Brickey rule. Conserving judicial resources is likewise the purpose of'thepreliminary 
hearing, not the Brickey rule. 
Defendant has taken language referring to the purposes of the preliminary hearing and 
rephrased it to refer to the purposes of the Brickey rule. The Supreme Court never suggested 
that these purposes are equivalent with the purposes of the Brickey rule. To the contrary, 
Brickey is only concerned with the refiling of criminal charges to the extent that refiling is 
done with an intent to harass, forum shop, impair a defendant's discovery rights, or ambush a 
defendant at trial. Otherwise, "Brickey does n o t . . . indicate any intent to forbid refiling 
generally or preclude refiling where a defendant's due process rights are not implicated." 
Morgan, 2001 UT 87, at Tf 15. 
As held by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals—the source of Utah's Brickey rule—the 
due process limits on refiling charges earlier dismissed does not "provide for any lessening 
of the examining magistrate's discretion in the conduct of a preliminary examination." 
Harper v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 484 P.2d 891, 897 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) 
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(emphasis added). As such, "granting the state a continuance at a preliminary examination is 
within the discretion of the examining magistrate." Id. 
3. Even if Brickey Applied to Reopenings and Continuances, the 
Reopening and Continuance Here Did Not Violate Brickey. 
Even assuming arguendo the Brickey rule did extend to reopenings and continuances, 
the reopening of the prosecution's case and continuance of the preliminary hearing here 
comported with state due process principles. 
As noted, Brickey holds that a prosecutor may not refile criminal charges earlier 
dismissed for insufficient evidence "unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously 
unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling." 714 P.2d at 
647. In Morgan, the Utah Supreme Court clarified that new and previously unavailable 
evidence are but two examples of good cause. 2001 UT 87, at % 19. The Court explained 
that "'[o]ther good cause' . . . simply means additional subcategories, other than 'new 
evidence' or 'previously unavailable evidence,' that justify refiling. Id. The Court then held 
that good cause includes an innocent miscalculation of the evidence required for bindover. 
Id. The Court explained that "the miscalculation must be innocent, and [that] further 
Harper concluded that "in the event the prosecutor miscalculates and fails to present 
sufficient evidence to show probable cause to bind over the accused, but possesses other 
witnesses whose testimony would strengthen his showing, it is clearly within the discretion 
of the examining magistrate to grant the state a continuance for that purpose." Harper, 484 
P.2d at 897. The court further stated that in such circumstances "it is presumed that the 
additional witnesses, or other evidence, are reasonably available; and that a continuance will 
not be sought in order to conduct further investigation seeking that evidence, in a dilatory 
manner." Id. 
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investigation must be nondilatory and not otherwise infringe on due process rights of 
defendant." Id. (emphasis in original). 
Defendant charges that the prosecutor was dilatory in her preparation, contending that 
she was not prepared to elicit testimony "establish[ing] what specific property was missing 
or recovered and its value." Aplt. Brf. at 22. Specifically, defendant alleges that the 
prosecutor failed to make available to the witnesses a list that would have provided the 
necessary evidence. Aplt. Brf. at 22. She argues that the victim could only "speculate" as to 
what was stolen, what was recovered, and the value. Aplt. Brf. at 22-24, 28, 34-40. 
According to defendant, the prosecutor's decision to go forward without more specific 
evidence cannot constitute an innocent miscalculation. Aplt. Brf. at 19-22. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the victim was not "engaged in a type of guessing 
game as to what exactly was missing and its probable worth." Aplt. Brf. at 35. Before the 
prosecutor initially rested, Hildebrand clearly and unequivocally testified that the thieves 
stole twelve autographed baseballs, a box containing some 300 baseball cards from 
underneath his bed, and ten binders of baseball cards from his book shelf in the front room. 
R. 222: 7-10. He estimated that his autographed baseballs were worth between $1,510 and 
$1,850.3 He testified that among the 300 cards in the large box, he had 35 autographed 
His most valuable baseball—autographed by living members of the 500 Home Run 
Club—was worth "well over [$]500." R. 222: 8. Of the remaining eleven baseballs, three 
were worth $50 each, those signed by Johnny Bench, Pete Rose, and Yogi Berra were worth 
between $120 and $150 each, and the remaining five were worth between $100 and $150 
each. R. 222:8,21-22. 
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cards, ranging in value from $400 for each of his two Willie Mays cards, to $ 150 to $200 for 
other players, to $100 or less for lesser players. R. 222: 10.4 He testified that the stolen 
binders included six sets of "specialty" cards, worth up to $3,000, and "hundreds and 
hundreds" of individual cards in each binder, worth "another $2,000." R. 222: 9. Through 
defendant's testimony, therefore, the State established that some $10,000 in baseball 
memorabilia was stolen. 
Defendant criticizes the evidence of value because Hildebrand testified only in terms 
of estimates or "probabl[e] worth." Aplt. Brf. at 34-40. However, the State was not required 
to prove the value of the stolen goods with mathematical certainty. At a preliminary hearing, 
the prosecution need only "present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief th^t an 
offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." State v. Clark, 2001UT 9, 
f 16, 20 P.3d 300 (emphasis added). Moreover, '"the magistrate must view all evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution.'" Id. at f 10 (quoting State v. Hester, 2000 UT 
App 159, <|f 7, 3 P.3d 725). An estimate of value by the owner of stolen property meets the 
probable cause burden. See State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1985) (holding that 
"[b]ecause an owner is presumed to be familiar with the value of his possessions, an owner is 
competent to testify on the present value of his property"). 
4
 The magistrate found that the total value of the 35 autographed balls was between 
$5,330 and $6,400. R. 176:^6. This finding fits within the price range given by Hildebrand 
and has not been challenged by defendant on appeal. 
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Hildebrand also testified that after defendant and Boone were apprehended, he 
recovered all the autographed baseballs. R. 222: 14, 20-22, 36. He further testified that he 
recovered "a lot of the cards that had been in the box" and "many of the binders" of baseball 
cards, though some pages were missing. R. 222: 14-15,24,36. Although most of the more 
valuable cards in the box were not recovered, he testified that he did recover the two Willie 
Mays cards (valued at $400 each). R. 222: 24. Allen also testified that some of the cards 
presented to him at the card shop were "expensive individual cards that were graded." R. 
222: 30. Hildebrand did not more specifically identify the cards that were recovered or give 
a separate estimate of their value. However, he had already estimated the total value of 
stolen cards to be as much as $8,300, apart from the Willie Mays cards. Where he had 
recovered a "lot of the cards" in the box and "many" of the binders, including the expensive 
cards presented to Allen, the magistrate could reasonably infer that another $2,700 in cards 
had been recovered, equating to less than one-third of the value of all the stolen cards. The 
evidence was thus sufficient for bindover on a second degree felony before the continuance, 
as the magistrate ultimately ruled. See R. 180: If 21. 
Even if it was not, nothing in the record suggests that the prosecutor's failure to 
produce sufficient evidence regarding value was anything more than an innocent 
miscalculation. Where Hildebrand identified the property taken from his apartment and its 
estimated value, the prosecutor reasonably assumed that he also would be able to provide 
estimates of the value of the recovered property—with or without exhibits or lists. 
Moreover, the record reveals that the prosecutor "had a problem with subpoenas," and as a 
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result, Detective Johnson did not have time to get the evidence. R. 222: 52,54. Given these 
circumstances, any lack of evidence to establish a second degree felony can only be regarded 
as an innocent miscalculation. Certainly, the prosecutor cannot be said to have been 
"seeking an unfair advantage over [ ] defendant [by] . . . withholding evidence." Redd, 2001 
UT 113, at 113. 
Citing Holmes v. District Court of Summit County, 668 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1983), 
defendant accuses the prosecutor here of'"the undesirable practice of presenting as little 
evidence as possible at the preliminary hearing.'" Aplt. Brf. at 45 (quotingHolmes, 668 P.2d 
at 15). In Holmes, however, the prosecutor made a tactical decision not to call the informant 
who participated in a controlled buy, relying instead on the hearsay testimony of the 
investigating officer. Holmes, 668 P.2d at 13. In contrast, the prosecutor here called the 
victim of the theft, who was in the best position to testify regarding the recovered cards. 
There was no attempt to conceal that testimony. Holmes therefore does not apply. 
Nor is this case like Redd, where the prosecutor "failed to provide a scintilla of 
evidence" on an essential element of the offense. Redd, 2001 UT 113, at 117. In Redd, the 
Utah Supreme Court concluded that "[a] presumptively abusive practice [also] occurs when a 
prosecutor refiles a charge after providing no evidence for an essential and clear element of a 
crime at a preliminary hearing." Id. at \ 20 (emphasis added). As discussed above, the 
evidence established that in addition to the twelve baseballs, valued at up to $1,850, and the 
two Willie Mays cards, valued at $800, Hildebrand recovered a "lot of the cards" in the box 
and "many" of the binders. R. 222: 14-15,24, 36. Although the exact value of these cards 
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was not established, the magistrate could reasonably infer that they represented a significant 
portion of the remainder of the baseball card collection, valued at some $8,300. See, supra, 
at 18. 
In sum, the prosecutor's failure to produce more specific evidence of value was at 
worst an innocent miscalculation of the evidence. Therefore, even if Brickey applied here, 
the magistrate did not violate due process in allowing the State to reopen its case after resting 
and in continuing the preliminary hearing for additional evidence. 
B. NEITHER THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE NOR THE RULES OF 
EVIDENCE BAR A CONTINUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY HEARING OR THE 
REOPENING OF THE STATE'S CASE AFTER THE PROSECUTION HAS 
RESTED. 
Defendant also cites rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence as support for his claim 
that a preliminary hearing may not be continued. Aplt. Brf. at 42-43, 50. Defendant's 
reliance on that rule is misplaced. 
Paragraph (a) of rule 1102 provides that "[rjeliable hearsay is admissible at criminal 
preliminary examinations." Utah R. Evid. 1102(a). Paragraph (b) lists nine types of hearsay 
evidence that is deemed reliable "[f]or purposes of criminal preliminary examinations only." 
Utah R. Evid. 1102(b). Paragraph (c) of the rule provides: 
(c) Continuance for Production of Additional Evidence. If hearsay 
evidence is proffered or admitted in the preliminary examination, a 
continuance of the hearing may be granted for the purpose of furnishing 
additional evidence if: 
(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is 
not sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or 
(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly 
disadvantaged by the use of the hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests 
of the declarant and the efficient administration of justice. 
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Utah R. Evid. 1102(c). In other words, "[paragraph (c) provides for continuances in the 
preliminary examination to enable a party to provide live witnesses or a more reliable form 
of hearsay where a party is substantially disadvantaged by the admission or exclusion of 
hearsay evidence proffered under this rule." Utah R. Evid. 1102, Advisory Committee Note. 
As the foregoing examination of the rule demonstrates, rule 1102 does no more than 
govern the admission of hearsay at a preliminary hearing. It does not purport to limit the 
magistrate's discretion in granting continuances generally, as argued by defendant. 
Defendant also contends that rule 7(i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
prohibits the State from reopening its case after it has rested or from obtaining a continuance 
after having introduced some evidence. Aplt. Brf. at 41,48-50. Rule 7(i) contains no such 
prohibition. 
Rule 7(i) provides in relevant part as follows: 
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that 
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed 
it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to 
answer in the district court. . . . 
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate 
shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may 
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The 
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i). The rule presupposes the termination of the hearing and the inclusion 
of all the State's evidence. It in no way suggests that the magistrate may not permit the State 
to reopen its case after resting but before a final order of dismissal. 
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Moreover, rule 7 provides that "a preliminary examination shall be held under rules 
and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court." Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(l). The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that a court "has broad latitude to control and manage the 
proceedings and preserve the integrity of the trial process." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 
1282 (Utah 1989). 
Consistent with a court's broad latitude in managing the proceedings, Utah appellate 
courts have long recognized that a trial court may grant a prosecutor's request to reopen its 
case at trial to meet an insufficiency challenge. State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, f 35, 65 
P.3d 648, cert, granted on other grounds, 16 P.3d 691 (Utah 2003). For example, in State v. 
Gregorious, 81 Utah 33, 16 P.2d 893 (1932), the defendant was charged with having 
committed an infamous crime against nature. The State rested its case after calling as its 
only witness an accomplice to the crime. Id. at 894-95. Citing the rule that a conviction 
could not be sustained based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, the 
defendant moved for a directed verdict for insufficient evidence. Id. at 895. Rather than 
granting defendant's motion, the trial court granted the State's request to reopen the case so 
that it could call a witness who could provide the corroborating testimony. Id. The Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that "[i]t was within the discretion of the 
court to permit the case to be reopened." Id. 
InState v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323,234 P.2d 600 (1951), the State charged defendant 
with grand larceny, but failed to put on any evidence of the value of the stolen car. Id. at 
325-26, 234 P.2d at 601. Rather than moving to reopen the case, the State asked the trial 
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court to take judicial notice that the car's value exceeded the grand larceny requirements. Id. 
at 326, 234 P.2d at 601. The court denied the motion for a directed verdict and instructed the 
jury that it must "'take the value of this property as being in excess of $50.00 and therefore 
the defendant, if he is guilty at all, is guilty of grand larceny.'" Id. In holding that the judge 
erred in so instructing the jury, the Supreme Court noted that the prosecutor "might properly 
and with little difficulty have moved to reopen and supply the missing evidence." Id. 
Just as a trial court has the discretion to permit the State to reopen its case in response 
to an insufficiency challenge after the prosecution has rested, a magistrate has the authority 
to permit the State to reopen its case or to continue a preliminary hearing. 
Relying on State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Utah App. 1989) {opinion withdrawn 
from publication May 8, 1990), defendant contends that a motion to reopen a preliminary 
hearing is not recognized in Utah. Aplt. Brf. at 15 fii.2, 42.5 Defendant fails to mention, 
however, that the State's motion to reopen the preliminary hearing in Johnson came after the 
magistrate dismissed the charges following a preliminary hearing, and was treated as a 
motion for a new trial, which indeed it was. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533, *l-2. Therefore, the 
motion to reopen in Johnson was not a motion similar in kind to that made by the prosecutor 
in this case, which came during the preliminary hearing. The State's motion to reopen in 
5
 The decision in Johnson was withdrawn from publication after a rehearing was 
granted. See Johnson, 782 P.2d 533. Although the decision no longer appears in the bound 
volume of the Pacific Reporter, the State uses the Pacific Reporter citation because it can be 
located in Westlaw with that citation. Pin cites, however, are not available, and the State 
thus uses the screen number, e.g., Johnson, 782 P.2d 533, at *3. 
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Johnson "serve[d] no purpose other than to request the trial court to reconsider its order of 
dismissal" Id. As mentioned, no order of dismissal was issued in this case. Johnson, 
therefore, does not support defendant's claim. 
* * * 
In summary, the preliminary hearing is not a game, where every misstep by the 
prosecutor inures to the benefit of the defendant. The Brickey rule itself focuses on 
balancing both a prosecutor's right to freely prosecute and a defendant's due process rights. 
Morgan, 2001 UT 87, at % 11. And as aptly observed by the Supreme Court of North Dakota 
long ago, "[rjules of criminal procedure were not formulated to enable criminals to escape 
punishment," but rather, "to aid the courts in properly dispensing justice in criminal cases." 
State v. Webb, 162 N.W. 358, 362 (N.D. 1917). Continuing, the North Dakota court 
observed that such rules "are intended, on the one hand, to safeguard the rights of the 
accused to the end that no innocent person may be convicted of crime, and they are intended, 
on the other hand, to enable the state to bring those guilty of crime to the bar of justice." Id. 
Where a prosecutor fails to put on sufficient evidence to bind over a defendant, neither due 
process nor the rules of procedure bar the court from reopening the case or continuing the 
hearing to provide the necessary evidence. 
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II. THE EVIDENCE AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE THAT 
DEFENDANT POSSESSED THE BASEBALL MEMORABILIA FOUND 
IN HIS FRIEND'S CAR AND APARTMENT 
Defendant further argues that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate his 
constructive possession of the baseball memorabilia inside his friend's car and apartment. 
Aplt. Brf. at 30-34. This claim fails. 
To demonstrate constructive possession, the State must establish "that there was a 
sufficient nexus between the accused and the [property] to permit an inference that the 
accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the 
[property]." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme Court has 
explained that the determination of constructive possession "turns on the particular 
circumstances of the case." Id. Factors that may be considered in linking an accused with 
property include incriminating statements, suspicious or incriminating behavior, sale of [the 
property], use of [the property], proximity of defendant to location of [the property], 
[property] in plain view, and [property] on defendant's person." State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 
1386,1388 (Utah App. 1991). These factors, however, "are not universally pertinent factors, 
and they are not legal elements of constructive possession in any context." State v. Layman, 
985 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1999). 
For purposes of bindover, the evidence was sufficient to establish a reasonable belief 
that defendant had both the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the 
stolen baseball memorabilia. 
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Defendant made incriminating statements, admitting that he possessed Hildebrand's 
stolen baseball cards. When interviewed about the stolen cards, he claimed that he had 
"found some baseball cards and other items" near a dumpster while at work. R. 222: 35,37-
39. He explained that he decided to sell the cards because he believed they were worth some 
money. R. 222: 35, 37-39. Boone also made statements incriminating defendant. Boone 
told Detective Johnson that defendant had asked him for a ride so defendant could sell some 
cards. R. 222: 43. Defendant sold some of Hildebrand's stolen baseball cards. The 
evidence established that two men walked into Allen's baseball card shop wanting to sell 
Hildebrand's stolen baseball cards. R. 222:28-29. Defendant was subsequently found with 
a check from a card shop payable to defendant at the check cashing store to which Allen 
referred the two men. See R. 222: 13, 33-35, 37, 39, 42. A stolen baseball and card were 
found in the area where defendant presumably sat while traveling to sell the baseball cards. 
Defendant admitted that he rode in Boone's car and the most expensive baseball and a 
baseball card were found on the front passenger floorboard of Boone's car. R. 222: 36. 
Although the foregoing evidence might not be sufficient to prove constructive 
possession at trial, it is more than sufficient under the "relatively low" evidentiary standard 
required at a preliminary hearing. Clark, 2001 UT 9, at ^ f 10. Under this standard, the facts 
need only support a reasonable inference of possession. Id. at ^ 11, 20. This is so even if 
the facts also support a contrary inference. Id. at \ 20. Indeed, this Court "'assum[es] [ ] that 
the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the investigation continues.'" Id. (quoting 
Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1998)). 
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Based on Boone's admission that he was responding to defendant's request for a ride 
to sell the baseball cards and defendant's admission that he possessed baseball cards which 
were stolen from Hildebrand, the magistrate could reasonably infer that defendant first took 
the cards to Boone's apartment and from there went to the card shop. The magistrate could 
also reasonably infer that Boone minimized his own role in the theft and that both men 
possessed the cards. Either way, the reasonable inference is that defendant had both the 
power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the cards in both the trunk and the 
apartment. The only other inference is that defendant found some of the stolen cards at work 
and that Boone obtained possession of the other cards independently. That inference is the 
least likely of all the inferences. 
In sum, the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that defendant 
possessed all of the stolen cards that were recovered by police. This Court should therefore 
affirm the magistrate's bindover order. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
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(Motion to Quash Bindover) 
Case No. 021101432 FS 
Judge PAT B.BRIAN Defendant. 
f 1 The above-entitled matter came before the Court on April 29, 2003 for hearing on Daniel 
Rogers (Defendant) Motion to Quash Bindover. The Court has reviewed Defendant's motion 
and supplemental memorandum and the State's opposition to Defendant's motion. Having 
considered those memoranda along with oral arguments, the applicable constitutional provisions, 
statutes and case law, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to quash. 
BACKGROUND 
Tf2 On August 20,2002, the Defendant was charged by information for theft by receiving 
stolen property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Aim. § 76-6-408 and theft by 
deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405. 
[^3 A preliminary hearing was scheduled for November 7, 2002. On November 4, 2002, the 
State requested a continuance. That same day, the Court granted the State's motion to continue 
and the preliminary hearing was rescheduled for November 26, 2002. 
\A On November 26, 2002, Defendant failed to appear. The Court issued a bench warrant 
for Defendant and rescheduled the preliminary hearing for December 17, 2002. 
^5 On December 17, 2002, the preliminary hearing was held before the court, Roth, J. 
000175 
Tf6 The following facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, were established at 
the December 17, 2002, preliminary hearing. On July 23, 2002, sometime between one p.m. to 
eight p.m., Robert Paul Hildebrand's, (Hildebrand) apartment was broken into and many items 
stolen. Specifically, an unopened six disc, DVD player worth $750, a minolta 35 mm camera 
worth $200, a pioneer stereo with a six disc player, originally worth $900 present value $400-
500, twelve (12) autographed baseballs total value between $1450-1850, ten (10) binders of 
baseball cards total value about $5000, autographed cards total value between $5330-6400, a set 
of black pearl earrings originally cost $1250 with a present value of $1500, and Olympic pins 
worth $200. Hildebrand contacted the police department. 
Y7 The following day, on July 24, 2002, Hildebrand contacted several, local baseball card 
shops to tell them to watch for the stolen items. Hildebrand contacted baseball card shop owner, 
Elvin Allen (Allen), about the stolen baseballs and cards. Within an hour, two men entered 
Allen's store with items that Allen believed were Hildebrand's stolen items. Allen purchased 
some of the items from the men using a check. Allen immediately contacted Hildebrand and 
informed Hildebrand that he had Hildenbrand's stolen items. 
TJ8 Allen cancelled the check. Later that day, Allen received a call from a check cashing 
place, as shown on his caller ID. Allen contacted Hildebrand and told him that the people were 
attempting to cash the check at a check cashing place and gave Hildebrand the phone number 
displayed on his caller ID. 
[^9 Hildebrand contacted the police and gave them the phone number to trace the address of 
the check cashing location. The police arrived and observed a signed, encased baseball in the 
front seat and a baseball card on the floor of the front, passenger seat of the vehicle that the 
-2-
Defendant and his companion, Joshua Boone (Boone) arrived in. The vehicle that Defendant and 
Boone arrived in was owned by Boone's girlfriend. The police detained Defendant and Boone. 
In the trunk of the vehicle, were many baseball cards. Defendant informed the police that he 
found the baseball cards in a dumpster. Thereafter, police discovered at Boone's apartment, 
multiple baseballs, binders, baseball cards, DVD/CD player, and Olympic pins, 
f 10 At the December 17, 2002 hearing, after the State rested, Defendant argued that there was 
insufficient evidence to bindover. Specifically, Defendant argued that the value of the items was 
not sufficiently established to bindover for the second degree felony charge because the only 
evidence associated with Defendant was one baseball and one card. Even viewing the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the State, this did not amount to $5000, which is an element of the 
charge for theft by receiving stolen property. Defendant argued, therefore, that the bindover 
should be denied on that count. 
f 11 The State moved to reopen because the Prosecutor was "given some more information" 
and needed to take some further testimony. Defendant objected, arguing that the State rested its 
case. The Court granted the motion to reopen. 
[^12 The State recalled the police officer to the stand and asked him questions about the black 
pearl earrings. The officer indicated that the earrings were pawned. Although the officer did not 
have the pawn receipt with him, he recalled that it was in evidence at the sheriffs office. 
[^13 The Court sua sponte continued the hearing on the limited issue of value of the items 
found that were attributable to Defendant, which the Court stated was the baseballs and baseball 
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cards found in the car and the home.1 Defendant objected arguing that a continuance was in 
opposition to the purpose of a preliminary hearing because after the State rests its case and 
Defense counsel reveals all of the State's weaknesses, the court can just grant a continuance, 
allow the State to gather more evidence for the next hearing, so that there would be sufficient 
evidence to bindover the Defendant. 
f 14 On January 7, 2003 a hearing was held on the limited issue of the value of the items 
found attributable to the Defendant in the car and at the home. 
[^15 The Court, Roth, J., bound over for trial the first charge for theft by receiving 
stolen property, a second degree felony, in violation of § 76-6-408 and dismissed the second 
charge for theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of § 76-6-405 
LAW 
HI6 At a preliminary hearing "the prosecution must present evidence sufficient for the 
magistrate to find probable cause to believe that the crime charged had been committed and that 
the defendant has committed i t . . . . The evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution with all inferences resolved in the prosecution's favor... . The defendant should be 
bound over for trial unless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference 
to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim." State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, 
flO, 44 P.3d 730 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.). Recently, the Utah 
Supreme Court clarified that the "quantum of evidence necessary to support a bindover is less 
1
 The Court also continued the hearing on the issue of the earrings and the pawn ticket. 
Defendant objected and the State stipulated that the earrings and pawn ticket would not be an 
issue at the next hearing. 
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than that necessary to survive a directed verdict motion." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,1fl6, 20 
P.3d 300. While the prosecution must produce "believable evidence of all the elements of the 
crime charged" in order to sustain its burden at the preliminary hearing stage, "unlike a motion 
for a directed verdict, this evidence need not be capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt." /rf. a t f l5 . 
Tf 17 Section 76-6-408 provides that theft by receiving stolen property occurs when: 
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the 
property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing 
that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds 
or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from the 
owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the 
owner of it. 
Tfl8 Theft of property is a second degree felony if the value of the property or services is or 
exceeds $5000. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(a)(i). If the value of the property stolen is less 
than $300 then the theft charge is a class B misdemeanor. § 76-6-412(l)(d). 
ANALYSIS 
Tfl9 Defendant claims that the Court improperly granted the State's motion to reopen. 
Specifically, Defendant argues that a motion to 'reopen5 a preliminary hearing is not a motion 
recognized in the Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure citing State v. Johnson, 1989 Utah App, 
LEXIS 172, *3 (October 30, I989)(unpublished opinion). 
[^20 In opposition, the State argues that there was sufficient evidence to establish the second 
degree felony charge before the Court granted the State's motion to reopen. The Court agrees 
with the State. 
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f21 The Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence presented before the motion to 
reopen was granted because the evidence presented established that Defendant was in possession 
or control of $5000 or more of stolen properly. The evidence showed that Defendant was in 
possession or control of the property that was pawned to Allen because the check was written in 
Defendant's name. Defendant was also in possession or control of the property that was in the 
vehicle that Defendant and Boone arrived in at the check cashing place. The evidence reflected 
that there was a signed, encased baseball in the front seat and a baseball card on the front, floor 
of the passenger seat. In the trunk of the vehicle there were multiple baseball cards. Defense 
counsel inquired of the Court, Roth, J., whether the evidence at the apartment would be 
considered and the Court, Roth, J., affirmed that it would be. Defense counsel did not object. 
Applying the evidence obtained in the apartment as well as the evidence obtained in the vehicle 
and at the pawn shop, the Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence from Hildebrand's 
testimony that the value of the stolen property recovered was $5000 or more.2 
2
 Nevertheless, the Court notes that although a motion to reopen is not a motion within 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court's, Roth, J., granting of the motion to reopen was 
harmless error. The Court could have dismissed the charges under Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3). 
However, the dismissal and discharge would not have precluded the State from refiling because 
good cause to re-file exists "when a prosecutor innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence 
required to obtain a bindover." State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, f 14, 34 P.3d 767 (Utah 
200l)(citing State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 n.5 (Utah 1986). It is clear to this Court that 
there were no abusive practices involved in the State's motion to reopen, but simply an innocent 
miscalculation of the evidence necessary to bindover. Witnesses that were called at the first 
hearing were recalled during that hearing and at the second hearing to provide more detail about 
the value of the items. There does not appear to be any bad faith on the part of the prosecutor, 
which is what could prevent the State from refiling. Since the result would have been the same 
because the State could have refiled and anothei preliminary hearing could have been held before 
the Court, Roth, J., this Court notes that even if the evidence was insufficient, the Court, Roth, /., 
committed harmless error that was not prejudicial to the Defendant. If anything, the Court, Roth, 
J., prevented an inconvenience to the Defendant by reopening the State's case. State v. Morgan, 
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